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Nowadays, it is conventional wisdom to stress that guerrilla warfare is the
weapon of the weak, but that cliché sidesteps the equally challenging questions of
disaggregating the dimensions of weakness for the guerrillas, on the one hand, as
well as probing the breadth and depth of strength for the opponents of the guer-
rillas, on the other hand. The study of guerrilla warfare has given rise to some-
thing more than a cottage industry devoted both to the theory and practice of
counterinsurgency as well as to how and why one protagonist defeats the other or
produces a stalemate leading to a negotiated settlement of the conflict. It is not
uncommon, especially in the US armed services, to find that academically gifted
soldiers (and sometimes sailors, marines, or air force members) spend time in
graduate schools and write their doctoral dissertations on military or naval topics,
including counterinsurgency studies. A handful of these soldier-sailor-air force
scholars (such as General Brent Scowcroft, Admiral William Crowe, and General
Samuel Griffith) have risen to considerable heights in the military and security
fields. During the Vietnam War era, there was a proliferation of studies, often
undertaken by think tanks or research bureaux with government contracts, which
attempted to elevate, if not to popularize and academically legitimate, the study
of partisan war, rebellions, and counterinsurgency campaigns. President John F.
Kennedy is usually associated with the renewed interest in the ways, means, and
doctrine of counterinsurgency warfare, which increasingly became the province
of special, elite military units rather than of the military establishment as a whole. 
Tim Jones’ volume, which grew out of his 1992 Kings College, University
of London doctoral dissertation, is an excellent example not only of the fine work
done in the Department of War Studies there but also of the kinds of questions
younger scholars are asking now in what could be called second generation stud-
ies. Perhaps the overarching theme in Jones’ work focuses on what he terms “les-
son-learning” (pp. 138, 140, and 144) from the post-World War Two  Palestinian,
Greek, and Malayan counterinsurgency campaigns in which one set of British
military and police actions and policies serves as an exemplar not only for subse-
quent battles but also for battles that were in progress elsewhere or for battles that
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were anticipated in the immediate future. The texts for counterinsurgent warriors
were being updated and revised in a sustained manner, although the author makes
clear throughout his study that some mid- to high-ranking British officers have
had a braking effect and have continued repeating the tactics of the past that
sometimes went under the rubric of imperial policing (within the British empire).
Yet, over time, the innovative doctrine took hold and drew from not only military
practitioners but also those in the psychological warfare, foreign and colonial
affairs, and intelligence communities. The author demonstrates that the imple-
mentation of the new doctrines tended to be somewhat softer, more consensual,
entail civic action, and focus on the hearts and minds of the usually uncommitted
target population groups, thereby undercutting and menacing covert or overt pop-
ular support for the insurgents. Especially in the Malayan case, Jones indicates
that British success meant a meaningful commitment to making more and more
Malays – and even the Chinese minority – stakeholders in the revamping of the
political system to facilitate the later granting of independence. His book, which
has three maps, five pages of abbreviations, 48 pages of endnotes, and 23 pages
of bibliography, is a welcome complement to Keith B. Bickel’s captivating vol-
ume, Mars Learning: The Marine Corps’ Development of Small Wars Doctrine,
1915-1940 (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2001). Although Bickel’s focus is on the US
Marine Corps, and not the US Army, his research suggests what a tortuous path
doctrinal pioneers have to travel in the murky area of counterinsurgency warfare.
As the principal exponents and practitioners of counterinsurgency in the period
between the First and Second World Wars, the US Marine Corps military intel-
lectuals faced inter-service and civilian bureaucratic infighting and studied indif-
ference before they were able to codify the counterinsurgency lessons they had
learned in their Central American and Caribbean islands tours of duty. To some
extent, as Bickel has shown, the Marine Corps small wars experts did incorporate
British examples and findings into the various drafts of their classic manual.
Although Jones’ volume can be characterized by a smooth writing style and a
keen sense of narrative and probing analysis, supported by numerous interviews
and painstaking archival work (among a wide array of archives in the United
Kingdom), it is not self-consciously theoretical in orientation, as is often the case
with works that began as doctoral dissertations. Those who are drawn to theoret-
ical approaches will appreciate Bickel’s work on the development of small wars
doctrine in the US Marine Corps, as well as John A. Nagl’s Counterinsurgency
Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning To Eat Soup with a Knife (Westport,
CT: Praeger, 2002). Both of these works attempt to account primarily for the
interrupted flow of analysis and suggestions from the lower to the higher echelons
of the military establishment. Such bureaucratic and communications obstruc-
tions can unfortunately result in doctrinal, if not humiliating tactical and strategic,
failures.  Dr. Norma Kriger, well-known for her earlier path-breaking work on
Zimbabwe (Zimbabwe’s Guerrilla War: Peasant Voices. African Studies Series
no. 70 [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992]), has opened a new
research vista on the brokered effects of the end of a guerrilla war in pursuit of
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independence. She is a well-respected political scientist who is well versed in
archival and interviewing research techniques and, like Jones, has taught in a
number of universities. After reviewing a large body of peace-building studies,
she finds that little research has been undertaken on the fate of guerrilla fighters
who are often bypassed in the search for colonial largesse. Such veterans are the
focus of her study which explores how, and to what extent, state resources are
extracted and channelled to those who fought, or alleged that they fought, in the
liberation war and how the symbols of state and party legitimacy are employed in
the scramble for spoils and status within the new, postwar state. Thus, the matter
she has chosen to investigate, within the context of a successful war for inde-
pendence, are, in some measure or other, common not only to guerrilla-coun-
terinsurgency wars but also to larger, conventional wars. The veterans bonus
march in Washington, DC after the First World War, as well as educational bene-
fits (such as the GI bill after the Second World War) and veterans’ preference in
government employment are all familiar examples of state resources allocated to
veterans’ needs in postwar US situations. 
In the case of Zimbabwe, however, the British government, as the residual
and nominal sovereign, played a critical role in the (London) Lancaster House
negotiations that led to independence in 1980. There were two major liberation
armies and their patron political parties (Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe African
National Union [ZANU] and its military wing the Zimbabwe African National
Liberation Army [ZANLA], on the one side, and Joshua Nkomo’s Zimbabwe
African People’s Union [ZAPU] and its guerrilla force, the Zimbabwe People’s
Revolutionary Army [ZIPRA], on the other side) that were contesting against the
Ian Smith regime and its client African political group led by Methodist Bishop
Abel Muzorewa. There were, in addition, two silent Cold War partners involved
in addition to the British, the Chinese (who backed ZANLA), and the Soviets
(who favored ZIPRA), but neither member of the communist bloc participated in
the Lancaster House negotiations, which were overseen by the British. The essen-
tial battle for political hegemony was waged by ZANU and ZAPU, each of which
could draw upon its guerrilla forces, who were waiting in the wings as bargaining
counters should they be needed. Commonwealth forces were involved in the
implementation of the Lancaster House agreement for they monitored the assem-
bly points where the guerrillas presented themselves and their weapons to begin
the demilitarization of the country prior to elections for the independence legisla-
ture. 
As Kriger carefully demonstrates, there was incomplete transparency in this
process, for both ZANLA and ZIPRA withheld men and arms from the counting
process should they perceive that the balance of power was tipping in favor of
their opponents. Equally troubling was the utilization of intermittent violence in
pursuit of electoral campaigning (which also occurred in Namibia in 1989 as it
too moved to the goal of independence in 1990) and the fraud involved in claim-
ing veterans’ cash payments. Given the high stakes involved in the conquest of
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political control at the national level and the experience of a prolonged guerrilla
war, such lack of probity was not particularly surprising but probably ethically
disappointing to their overseas solidarity groups. The British army (in the form of
the British Military Advisory Training Team or BMATT) served as the organizer
for the challenging task of melding together a new Zimbabwe army from the two
antagonistic guerrilla armies and their former foes in the Rhodesian army.
BMATT also served the same capacity in newly independent Namibia in order to
craft the Namibian Defense Force from former foes. Instead of a military triad of
ZANLA, ZIPRA, and the (African as well as white) members of the former
Rhodesian army, what resulted over time was an independence army which was
essentially a ZANLA fiefdom designed to be a military instrument for Robert
Mugabe’s ZANLA, a party which subsequently achieved a hegemonic position
and used the machinery of the state to dispense clientage among its supporters.
Many of those who claimed guerrilla veteran status were the least well equipped
in terms of literacy and education to enter the commercial or professional sectors
of the economy and in a sense resembled German Free Corps units who served as
a type of freebooters in the nascent years of the Weimar Republic. They were, in
effect, the dispossessed and the economic casualties of the liberation war who
were least able to fend for themselves and had heightened expectations of rewards
in the post-colonial dispensation. The author found that both the dominant politi-
cal party as well as the former guerrillas displayed what she termed a “. . . remark-
able consistency in their power-seeking agendas, their appeals to the revolution-
ary liberation war, their use of violence and intimidation, and their abuse of state
resources.” (p. 208) 
Although they are focused on different times within the Cold War and post-
Cold War eras, both of these excellent studies are commendable in their scrupu-
lous attention to detail, their admirable command of both written and oral sources,
and their willingness to revisit previous research in order to strengthen our under-
standing of how military establishments develop skills and doctrines for small
wars (or low-intensity conflict) and of the unanticipated political and economic
fallout of successful guerrilla warfare. In such wars, there seems to be an opaque,
yet unmistakable primacy of politics at work. Jones is to be commended for bring-
ing to light the British role in the Greek civil war in the early years of the Cold
War, a topic he intends to explore in greater detail in his next volume, SAS: The
First Secret Wars (London: I.B. Tarus), while Kriger has undertaken a rather icon-
oclastic task in demonstrating the operation of a post-liberation war spoils system
which is a glaring example of a zero-sum game (with either winners or losers and
with no political space for ambiguous flexibility) waged under the rather specious
rubric of state legitimacy.  
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